Thursday, February 28, 2019
Presidential and Parliamentary Systems of Government Essay
Introduction and briny Distinguishing Features of Both SystemsA presidential trunk of governance is matchless in which thither is a manoeuvre of governing, i.e. the executive director branch, who is pick fall out from the general assembly and is non responsible to it. Generally, the legislative assembly does non hold spot to dismiss the executive. This placement tail be traced back to the monarchal system in the mediaeval ages which countries such as France, England and Scotland followed where the Crown held all executive mightinesss and not the parliament. When the office of the President of the get together States was created, this system of separate powers of the executive and legislature was replicated in the U.S. Constitution.In contrast, a parliamentary system is different from the above because its executive branch of government needs the direct or indirect substitute of the parliament to stay in power, which is generally expressed with a take of confid ence. However, the mechanism of checks and balances is different from unitary found in a presidential republic because there is no distinct separation of powers amongst the legislature and the executive. In parliamentary systems, the channelise of government and the honcho of asseverate are distinct entities, where the pisser is the aboriginal parson and the latter is an choose president or a hereditary monarch. The U.K. follows a parliamentary form of government, where the prime minister and the cabinet govern using their executive power on a daily basis, unless actual authority is held with the head of state.1In distinguishing betwixt presidential and parliamentary systems, three points must(prenominal) be considered. First, in a presidential system the head of government (the president) is elect for a fixed term and will serve this unless there is the crotchety and exceptional process of impeachment, whereas in a parliamentary system the head of government (prime mi nister or equivalent) is dependent on the confidence of the legislature and thus preempt be removed (along with the whole government) by a motion of no-confidence.Second, in a presidential system the head of government (the president) is popularly elect, if not literally directly by the voters then by an electoral college popularly elect expressly for this purpose, whereas in a parliamentary system the head of government (prime minister or equivalent) is selected by the legislature. Third, in a presidential system there is exitively a one-woman(prenominal) non-collegial executive, whereas in a parliamentary system the executive (i.e., the cabinet) is collective or collegial.2For his part, Sartori like Lijphart, makes three basic points in that a semipolitical system is presidential if, and only if, the head of state (president) i) results from popular election, ii) during his or her pre-established elevate stacknot be discharged by a parliamentary vote, and iii) heads or ea rly(a) than directs the governments that he or she appoints. There are two distinctions between Lijphart and Sartori worthy noting here.First of all, Lijphart refers to the president as the head of government whereas Sartori refers to him or her as the head of state. Second and related, Sartori conceives of the government as being broader than the individual president. As such, Sartori rejects as too narrow the notion that the head of state must in like manner be the head of government in favor of a looser notion that authority flows from the president down perhaps via a separate head of government.3Mainwaring attri howeveres two distinguishing births to a presidential republic. First, the head of government is elected independently of the legislature in the sense that legislative elections and post-election negotiations do not determine executive power. In countries where the chief executive is selected by the legislature, not as a second alternative when the popular vote doe s not produce a clear winner but as the primal process, the system is either parliamentary (the vast volume of cases) or a hybrid (as in Switzerland).Post-election negotiations that determine which parties will govern and which will head the government are crucial in m whatsoever parliamentary regimes, but they are not part of the selection process of chief executives in presidential systems. The chief executive in a presidential democracy is usually elected by popular vote, although some countries, notably the united States, take a shit an electoral college rather than direct popular elections. Even so, in the united States, the popular vote has a virtually binding effect on Electoral College votes.In other presidential systems, including those in Argentina, Bolivia, and cayenne pepper (before 1973), the congress votes for a president if there is no absolute majority in the popular vote. Yet the popular vote is the first criterion, and in Argentina and Chile, tradition has di ctated that congress will select the prospect with the approximately popular votes. Note that it must be the head of government-not just the president-who is elected by popular vote or an electoral college. In Austria, Iceland, and Ireland, the president is elected by direct popular vote but has only minor powers and is therefore not the head of government.4The second distinguishing feature of presidential democracies is that the president is elected for a fixed period of time. approximately presidential democracies allow for impeachment, but this practice is uncommon and does not intimately affect the definition because of its extraordinary character. The president cannot be forced to turn because of a no-confidence vote by the legislature, and consequently, the president is not formally accountable to congress. In a parliamentary system, in contrast, the head of government is elected by the legislature and subsequently depends on the ongoing confidence of the legislature to remain in office thus the time period is not fixed.5Implications for Policy Making and DemocracyWhether a regime is parliamentary or presidential has a major impact on significant aspects of political life how executive power is formed, relationships between the legislative and the executive branches, relationships between the executive and the political parties, the nature of the political parties, what happens when the executive loses support, and arguably eventide prospects for stable democracy and patterns of domination.The proponents of presidential claim that presidential systems claim that such systems ensure that the presidents power is a legitimate one because the president if, in most cases, elected directly by the people. The unify States follows a different system in which the president is elected by an electoral college but is still considered to be popularly elected. Parliamentary executives can not claim to be elected via a direct vote of the people. Separation of powers is another benefit which the presidential system provides because it established the executive branch and the legislative as two distinct structures which allows each body to supervise and oversee the other and prevents abuse of the system.In a parliamentary system, the executive is not separate from the legislature, reducing the chances of criticism or scrutiny, unless a formal condemnation in the form of a vote of no confidence takes place. Hence, in a parliamentary system, a prime ministers unethical deeds or instances of misconduct might neer be discovered as Woodrow Wyatt (former British Member of Parliament) said plot of ground writing slightly the famous Watergate scandals during the presidency of Richard Nixon, dont designate a Watergate couldnt happen here, you just wouldnt hear about it.6In a parliamentary system, even though the option of a vote of no confidence is available, it is an option resorted to only in thorough cases. It is considered extremely diffic ult to influence or stop a prime minister or cabinet who has already decided to pass legislation or implement measures.Voting against important legislation is tant totality to a vote of no confidence, as a consequence of which the government is changed afterwards holding of elections. This is a very tedious process because of which it is a rare occurrence in some parliamentary countries. Britain for example has only seldom undergone such a situation. Therefore, it is a good deal believed that in a parliamentary system, because of the deprivation of separation of powers, the Parliament can not actually exercise any real control over the executive.However, there can be a downside to separation of powers. Presidential systems can lead to a situations where the President and relation back both evade blame by passing it to the other. In the voice communication of former Treasury Secretary C. Douglas Dillon as he described the United States, The president blames Congress, the Congre ss blames the president, and the public remains confused and disgusted with government in Washington.7Woodrow Wilson agreed in his thesis, Congressional regime in the United States, as he said, how is the schoolmaster, the nation, to know which boy needs the whipping? . . . spot and strict accountability for its use are the essential constituents of good government. . . . It is, therefore, evidently a radical defect in our federal system that it parcels out power and confuses responsibility as it does.The main purpose of the Convention of 1787 seems to have been to accomplish this grievous mistake. The literary theory of checks and balances is simply a unvarying account of what our constitution makers tried to do and those checks and balances have proved sloshed just to the cessation which they have succeeded in establishing themselves . . . the Framers would be the first to view as that the only fruit of dividing power had been to make it irresponsible.8Separation of Powers has mixed implications. It can lead to gridlock, i.e. when it becomes next to impossible to pass items on the partys agenda because the legislature is almost equally divided, usually an occurrence in the U.S. when the Senate and House of Representatives are dominated by opposing parties. However, the upside to gridlock is that it often prevents radical policy changes.Another problem with the presidential system is that epoch it is inherently stable because the president is elected for a fixed term, this overly compounds the issue of the presidency being a zero-sum naughty, where winner takes all. As Linz (1990, 56) states, The riskiness that zero-sum presidential elections pose is compounded by the rigidity of the presidents fixed term in office. Winners and losers are sharply defined for the completed period of the presidential mandatelosers must wait four or five years without any access to executive power and patronage. The zero-sum game in presidential regimes raises the st akes of presidential elections and inevitably exacerbates their attendant tensity and polarization.Parliamentary elections can also lead to one party pleasing an absolute majority, in most scenarios a matter of parties gain agency through these elections. Power is often shared and coalitions are formed, as a consequence of which the position holders give due weight to the needs and interests of littler parties. In turn, these parties expect a certain share in power and as is obvious, are stakeholders in the overall system, instead of non-entities. Now if, as is the case in presidential systems, one sole person believes that he has independent authority and a popular mandate, he might exit to develop a tendency towards authoritarianism.When he develops such notions about his stand up and role, he will not react appropriately to the inevitable encounter to his policies, finding it annoying and unsettling, as would a prime minister who considers himself a mere representative of a temporary governing coalition and not the sole voice of the nation. Hence the examples of Venezuela and Colombia, where when democracy was reestablished in times of nifty political instability, and when the written constitutions warranted a presidential government, the leaders of chief political parties opted for consociational agreements whereby the rigid, winner-take-all consequences of presidential elections were softened.9While stability is often touted as one of the prime advantages of the presidential system, it is simply another word for rigidity. On the other hand, parliamentarism lends a certain element of flexibility to the political process. Advocates of presidentialism might respond that this rigidity is actually a plus because it prevents the uncertainty and instability so definitive of parliamentary politics. Under parliamentary government, after all, a number of entities, even rank-and-file legislators, can choose to adopt basic changes, cause realignments and shi fts, and, most importantly, make or break prime ministers.But it must be remembered that while the need for authority and predictability might serve as justifications for presidentialism, there can be a myriad of unexpected developments- anything from the death of the officer to serious errors in judgment committed under the pressure of ill political circumstances that often lead to the presidential rule being less predictable and often weaker than that of a prime minister. The latter can always make efforts to bolster up his legitimacy and authority, be it through a vote of confidence or the dissolution of parliament and the eventful new elections. Also, a prime minister can be changed without it inescapably leading to a major regime crisis.10ConclusionThe above abridgment has largely favored a parliamentary system over a presidential one. However, one must remember that success regimes, regardless of the amount of thought and care gone into their design, are determined by the extent of support they manage to arrest from society at large, its major forces, groups and institution. earthly concern consensus therefore is a basic need, which confers legitimacy to the authority of the regime, and this is achieved only by the power which is attained lawfully and in a democratic fashion.Regimes also depend to a large extent on the ability and cleverness of their leaders to govern, to arouse trust and to respect the boundaries of the power they hold. Every country has unique aspects that one must take into account-traditions of federalism, ethnic or heathen heterogeneity, and so on. Both systems have their pros and cons, even parliamentary systems can develop grave crises. Hence, countries must consider their own individual past, present and future, in order to determine which system has the greater probability of success.ReferencesHardin, Charles. 1989. A quarrel to Political Science. PS Political Science and Politics 22(3) 595-600.Lijphart, Arend, ed. 19 92. Introduction in A. Lijphart (ed.), Parliamentary versus presidential government. Oxford Oxford University Press.Linz, Juan. 1990. The Perils of Presidentialism. ledger of Democracy (Winter) 51-69.Mainwaring, Scott and Shugart, Matthew. 1997. Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy A diminutive Appraisal. relative Politics 29(4) 449-471.Mainwaring, Scott. 1990. Presidentialism in Latin America. Latin American look into Review 25(1)157-179.Sartori, Giovanni. 1994. Neither presidentialism nor parliamentarism, in J.J. Linz & A. Valenzuela (eds.), The failure of presidential democracy, vol. 1 Comparative perspectives. Baltimore, MD Johns Hopkins University Press.Thomas, Jo. Oct. 9 1988. The fate of two nations. The New York Times. Wilson, Woodrow. 1886. Congressional governance A Study in American Politics. The New Englander 45(192).1 Mainwaring, Scott and Shugart, Matthew. 1997. Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy A Critical Appraisal. Comparative Politics 29(4) 449-471 .2 Lijphart, Arend, ed. 1992. Introduction in A. Lijphart (ed.), Parliamentary versus presidential government.Oxford Oxford University Press.3 Sartori, Giovanni. 1994. Neither presidentialism nor parliamentarism, in J.J. Linz & A. Valenzuela (eds.), The failure of presidential democracy, vol. 1 Comparative perspectives. Baltimore, MD Johns Hopkins University Press.4 Mainwaring, Scott. 1990. Presidentialism in Latin America. Latin American Research Review 25(1)157-179.5 Linz, Juan. 1990. The Perils of Presidentialism. Journal of Democracy (Winter) 51-696 Thomas, Jo. Oct. 9 1988. The fate of two nations. The New York Times. 7 Hardin, Charles. 1989. A gainsay to Political Science. PS Political Science and Politics 22(3) 595-600.8 Wilson, Woodrow. 1886. Congressional Government A Study in American Politics. The New Englander 45(192).9 Linz, Juan. 1990.10 Linz, Juan. 1990.